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Abstract
The insider threat poses a significant risk to any network or information system.
A general definition of the insider threat is an authorized user performing unautho-
rized actions, a broad definition with no specifications on severity or action. While
limited research has been able to classify and detect insider threats, it is generally
understood that insider attacks are planned, and that there is a time period in which
the organization’s leadership can intervene and prevent the attack. Previous studies
have shown that the person’s behavior will generally change, and it is possible that
social network analysis could be used to observe those changes.
Unfortunately, generation of social network data can be a time consuming and
manually intensive process. This research discusses the automatic generation of such
data from computer mediated communication records. Using the tools developed
in this research, raw social network data can be gathered from communication logs
quickly and cheaply. Ideas on further analysis of this data for insider threat mitigation
are then presented.
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EFFICIENT GENERATION OF
SOCIAL NETWORK DATA FROM
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION LOGS
I. Introduction
1.1 Computer Security
Computers and networks have revolutionized the methods and speed in which
work is done. Ever-increasing amounts of information can be collected, stored, processed,
and disseminated in shorter amounts of time and at reduced cost. Computers and
networks have been critical to an organization’s ability to function. Defenseof these
information systems is therefore essential.
The threat of attacks on computer systems has been recognized at the highest
levels. In 1998, President Clinton addressed the potential danger of cyberattacks on
the computer systems that are necessary for the nation’s critical infrastructure [23].
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) states that it is the President’s intent
that the “United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any signif-
icant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures,
including especially our cyber systems.” This kind of unconventional attack may come
from foreign governments, foreign and domestic terrorist organizations, and foreign
and domestic criminal organizations.
Computer security in general has come a long way in defending against cyber-
attacks. The NSA prescribes a defense-in-depth methodology consisting of discrete
layers of defense using routers, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems (IDS) to
defend a computer network [8]. These layers protect individual machines, machines
subject to access controls, and defended by anti-virus programs. In terms of defending
against entities outside of the system without access, the defense-in-depth methodol-
ogy protects critical information relatively well. There are many viable commercial-
1
off-the-shelf (COTS) and open-source firewalls, IDS, and anti-virus programs that can
be readily integrated into a defense-in-depth security policy. Moreover, Microsoft, the
industry leader in operating system software, has made security a cornerstone of their
current and future software with the Trustworthy Computing initiative [20].
1.2 The Insider Threat
No matter how fortified a network, or how strong and complete a security policy,
no system is protected from abuse by authorized users. Seemingly harmless mistakes
or an unforeseen chain of events caused by careless or uninformed users can lead to a
dangerous security breach. Or even worse, a renegade administrator can wreak havoc
upon a system. While it is necessary to invest time and money to fortify networks
against external threats, it is also necessary to assess the threat from within.
The insider threat is well-documented, and many view it as the greatest risk
and be the most difficult to detect. For the purposes of this research, “insider” refers
to an individual who has been granted trusted access to an organization’s information
resources, including the computing network and data stores. The insider threat then,
is the threat that an insider would use their privileges to attack or otherwise misuse
the organizations information resources.
The insider threat is an increased danger to the system because an insider has
more knowledge of the system and its protection than a typical outsider. Moreover,
since the insider is already a trusted entity in the system, malicious acts may be
within established privileges and might not be detected. Given a large variety of
insider attacks, the difficulty of characterizing malicious insiders, and relative lack
of data characterizing, research in detecting insider threats has been limited. The
best method of mitigating the insider threat is to constantly monitor user behavior
and have managers intervene when appropriate. Unfortunately, managers can only
monitor subordinate behavior so much, and it is a difficult task where there are large
numbers of subordinates and given current business practices.
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1.3 Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis (SNA) is a relatively new field of psychology and so-
cial behavior founded upon the idea that the relationships between people are just
as important as the attributes of people. Social network analysis provides a rigor-
ous method of analyzing the interactions between members of a group. Since social
network data can be analyzed with graph theory concepts, the speed and power of
computers can be leveraged. Thus, social network analysis is an increasingly powerful
tool for quickly analyzing relationships of individuals. With broad application, social
network analysis has been used to help streamline business processes, improve inter-
nal organizational communication, and even position routers in a network topology
with great success.
In the context of mitigating the insider threat, it is possible that social network
analysis can identify individuals who may be higher risks to the organization. Study-
ing user behavior based on social network analysis metrics could potentially provide
means of characterizing the insider threat. Changes in social network analysis metrics
may indicate a change in an actor’s behavior. As Shaw writes, a change in behavior
may be indicative of a potential insider threat [30].
Unfortunately, building a social network is time consuming and may require a
degree of cooperation from the subjects being studied. Additionally, a social network
will also change over time, based on shifts in workload or project prioritization, which
might render existing maps obsolete. The purpose of this research then is to inves-
tigate means of building a social network map using automated tools/proceduresand
administrative logs of computer mediated communications (CMC) (e-mail, telephone
logs, instant messages, etc.) as a source of information.
1.4 Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the timeliness of execution and data
usability of a system that automates building social network data from electronic mail
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logs. It is the intent of this research to prove that a system that generates useful social
network data in a reasonable amount of time can be created. This system can then
provide raw social network data to other tools that use social network analysis, and
aid in the mitigation of the insider threat. This research is not intended to provide a
detector of tendencies of potential insider threats but instead a form of middleware
to process raw data into a form suitable for follow-on analysis. The system created
in this research can be used to provide social network data to help train a tendency
detector in the future.
1.5 Document Overview
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains an overview and review
of insider threat and social network analysis concepts. The methodology to and
experimental procedure of this research is described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses
the system created and is something of a user’s manual for it. Chapter 5 reports
test results showing that the system is viable based on the methodology described in
Chapter 3. The conclusions and impact, along with a vision for constructing an insider
threat tendency detector and recommended areas for future research are discussed in
Chapter 6.
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II. Background on The Insider Threat and Social Network
Analysis
This first section of this chapter describes the insider threat, the significant risk it
poses, current tools and research efforts toward mitigating its risk, and how to charac-
terize malicious insiders. The second section provides a definition for social network
analysis, its capabilities, and the difficulty of gathering social network data.
2.1 The Insider Threat
2.1.1 A Definition of the Insider Threat.
In its proceedings about mitigating the insider threat, RAND provides a straight-
forward definition: the insider threat is the threat of “Authorized users performing
unauthorized tasks” [24]. This is an extremely broad definition with no restrictions or
specifics on severity, intention, perpetrator, or what constitutes an unauthorized task.
For the purposes of this research, “insider” refers to an individual who has trusted
access to an organization’s information resources, to include the computing network
and data stores. The insider threat then, is the threat that an insider would use
his privileges to attack or otherwise misuse the organizations information resources.
The insider threat is an increased danger to the system because an insider has more
knowledge of the system and would be able to use this information to be more harm-
ful. Moreover, since the insider is already a trusted entity in the system, the insider’s
malicious acts may fall within normal privileges and thus this behavior might not be
observed or detected as they fall within normal behavior.
A straightforward example of an insider is a system administrator who knows
he will be laid off within the year. The day before he is laid off, he changes the
root password of an important database and tells the company that they can have
the password if they pay him a large sum of money. It could take months to crack
the password, and while that data is encrypted, the police would have a hard time
prosecuting the system administrator if he claims to have “forgotten” the password.
Furthermore, the system administrator may leak this information to a newspaper and
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cause bad press for the company. This places the company in a tight bind in which
the company may ultimately pay up to avoid the bad press and legal costs.
Espionage is possibly the most serious form of the insider threat. The case of
former FBI agent Robert Hanssen, who was convicted for spying for Russia, is an
extreme example of how insiders can take advantage of their access and authoriza-
tions. Over a span of more than 15 years, Hanssen provided his Russian contacts
with highly classified documents and details about U.S. intelligence sources and elec-
tronic surveillance taken directly from his employer, the FBI. Because Hanssen was
an authorized user, his activities didn’t raise any suspicion. While Hanssen used a
variety of devices for stealing data, he also repeatedly walked out of his FBI office
carrying classified paper documents in his briefcase, which in turn, he handed over to
his Russian contacts. Hanssen manually and electronically stole information from the
FBI for his own financial gain, and he did it for more than 15 years without trouble
because he was a trusted insider [5].
The insider threat can manifest itself in various forms, making it extremly diffi-
cult to detect. Also, with the insiders’ additional access and knowledge, the damage
that can be done from insider activity can be extremely severe.
2.1.2 Insider Threat Risk.
As can be imagined, the damage from insider attacks can be more devastating
than other attacks. The insider threat is an increased danger to the system because
an insider often has knowledge of the system’s vulnerabilities and would be able to use
this information to do more damage. Likewise, an insider knows what information
is most valuable to the organization. At the same time, the insider threat risk is
elevated because a high degree of technical skill is not required to carry out an insider
attack.
Figure 1 shows estimates of the losses caused by type of computer security
incident as reported in a survey taken by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and
FBI in 2004 [27]. By definition, sabotage and insider net abuse are insider attacks. In
6
Figure 1: Dollar Amount of Losses by Type [27]
addition, theft of proprietary information and financial fraud often require insiders,
and unauthorized access is more costly when done by insiders. With this in mind,
the insider threat accounted for over $30 million in damages [25].
The risk of losing proprietary information is especially dire when dealing with
classified information, information that can endanger national security. There is a
lot of classified information like this; there is an extremely high potential for grievous
damage, especially when insiders likely know what classified information carries the
greatest value on the black market [13]. The insider is often indispensable to “outside”
groups (including foreign interests) as they can provide help and information [30].
A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
American Society for Industrial Security International estimated that companies lost
up to $59 billion in intellectual property and proprietary information between July
2000 and June 2001. The largest average dollar value of loss per incident occurred in
research and development ($404,000), followed by financial data ($356,000) [36].
In the CSI/FBI survey as shown in Figure 2, incidents insider abuse of net access
were reported by 59% of corporations, theft of proprietary information by 10%, and
sabotage by about 2% [27]. While the percentage of incidents reported of these likely
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insider attacks decreased sharply from 2003, the insider threat is still very pervasive
and is second only to the ubiquitous virus threat. This decrease corresponds to a
general decrease in all instances of attacks, likely the result of increased awareness
and importance of information security. A similar decrease occurred in 2002, yet
reports of incidents rose in 2003.
Figure 2: Types of Attacks or Misuse Detected in 2004 (by percent) [27]
The Secret Service reports that risk associated with the insider threat is even
higher as attacks often require no technological expertise greater than what is required
to do the job. It was found that 87% of insider attacks in the banking and finance
sector required little or no technical expertise [25]. In fact, 43% of those attacks were
carried out while the perpetrator was logged in under their own credentials and only
23% of the malicious insiders held technical positions in information technology.
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It is clear that the potential for damage by insider attack is severe. With
their knowledge of the system, insiders can focus on vulnerabilities and high-value
targets without needing a lot of technical expertise. Unfortunately, strategies and
countermeasures to combat the insider threat are limited and none are truly effective.
2.1.3 Countermeasures to the Insider Threat.
Current techniques used in computer security are not able to cope with the
dynamic and increasingly complex nature of computer systems and their security
[2]. Since there are many different forms that insider attacks can take, the difficulty
these countermeasures face in detect insider attacks is tremendous. Thus, to further
mitigate the insider threat, something must be done on the preventative side, looking
for behaviors in insiders that indicate the potential to become insider threats.
The best countermeasures against insider attacks are general management strate-
gies, different types of intrusion detection systems, and honeypots. While all of the
aforementioned strategies have their strengths and should be used in conjunction to
mitigate the insider threat, they all have shortcomings. The underlying theme is that
it is extremely difficult to counter the insider threat by attempting to detect it with
current technologies.
2.1.3.1 General Management Strategies.
At the most fundamental level, security is a people problem that requires people
or people-based solutions to be solved. Since it is impossible to hire only people that
can be completely trusted it is imperative that there are good managers and man-
agerial strategies that foster good security practices. Shaw writes that management
that keeps its employees satisfied and loyal prevents insider incidents [30]. In a report
on the insider threat to US Government Information Systems in 1999, five strategies
were suggested in order of relative importance:
• Create good access controls
• Keep access logs
• Audit the actions of individuals
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• Protect sensitive information
• Detect covert access [12]
The first three of these strategies, if implemented extremely rigorously, can
eliminate the majority of insider threats. Ensuring good access controls means setting
an access controls that adhere to the principle of least privilege. This means that a
user should only have the privileges required to do their duties. This way, malicious
insiders can only compromise information that they have access to. Keeping access
logs and reviewing the actions of individuals provides evidence and accountability for
user actions. Additionally it also deters users from attempting to subvert security as
they know that they are being watched. Unfortunately, it is not possible or feasible
to audit every action taken by every user, and even if it were possible, it would be
difficult to determine the intentions of the actions [28].
Preventing and detecting covert access to sensitive information and networks is
much easier to say than do, as the actions are covert by nature. A strong defense
in depth security policy including firewalls and good access controls are essentially
the best way to prevent covert accesses. Detecting covert access implies the usage of
intrusion detection systems (IDS). Since the publishing of this paper, these policies
have become standard at any organization [27]. Still, insider attacks continue to be
reported frequently.
2.1.3.2 Intrusion Detection Systems.
As their name implies, intrusion detection systems help detect and identify
intrusions and attacks on a computer system or network. To detect intrusions, an
IDS analyzes and monitors information like network traffic, access logs, and host
data. An IDS is categorized by what it protects: a host-based IDS focuses primarily
on host data and a network-based IDS analyzes network traffic. An IDS can also be
categorized based on its approach for detecting an attack. The main categories are
signature-based, anomaly-based, and compound or hybrid.
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A signature-based IDS like SNORT is effective in detecting an insider attack if
the insider uses known attacks on the system and the IDS is properly configured to
monitor internal traffic [31]. These systems resemble anti-virus systems as they look
for patterns in packets and packet data, whereas anti-virus systems search for patterns
in file contents. Like an anti-virus system, a signature-based IDS requires updates for
new rules just as anti-virus systems require updates of their virus definitions. Rules are
based on individual attacks and require regularity to be effective. Effective rules can
be written because many network attacks use the same tools and have similarities. A
signature-based IDS is effective because many cyberattacks are carried out by “script
kiddies,” novice-level cybercriminals, who use the same tools. However, a signature-
based IDS does nothing if an attack’s signature is not in the rule set of the IDS or the
data is not abnormal. Insider attacks have so many different forms, instances, and
contexts that it is difficult to find patterns for them all. Moreover, an insider exploit
may be done with actions expected of the insider.
AFIT’s Computer Defense Immune System (CDIS) is an advanced network-
based IDS that is somewhat effective system in mitigating the insider threat. The
CDIS is a hybrid IDS based upon the Artificial Immune System (AIS), which is
modeled after the antibodies in the human immune system [2]. When the human
immune system detects a foreign antigen, something that is not a part of the human
“self,” it creates antibodies to destroy those specific antigens. Similarly, when the
CDIS detects foreign sequence actions, it creates a rule that triggers a future response
to that sequence or sequences like it. This approach uses evolutionary algorithms to
create rules that detect intrusions similar to the ones detected. However, as a hybrid
IDS, it suffers from the same problems that plague an anomaly-based IDS, primarily
the need to train the IDS with “normal” data. Since insider attacks can consist of the
same commands that a regular user would use on a normal basis, an anomaly-based
IDS will most likely be unable to detect the attack.
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An IDS is an essential part of the defense in depth strategy and should always
be deployed. While an IDS may not be able to detect many insider threats, it is still
very effective in detecting other attacks.
2.1.3.3 Honeypots.
Spitzner writes about how honeypots are used to detect and study insiders [32].
A general definition for a honeypot is “an information system resource whose value
lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.” Generally, a honeypot is a program
that emulates a server that provides an exploitable service or hosts important-looking
information. Honeypots can be used for slowing down or stopping automated attacks,
capturing new exploits to gathering intelligence on emerging threats or early warning
and prediction.
An example of a COTS honeypot is the Symantec Decoy Server (SDS) [33]. One
thing the SDS does is pretend to be a file server on the network containing sensitive
information. Since this server is not supposed to exist, any user trying to access it is
already doing something wrong.
Honeypots are great for studying attackers, detecting attacks on fake services,
and deterring potential insiders. They should be implemented as a part of any defense
in depth strategy. However, honeypots provide no warning or protection for actual
targets and the malicious insider often knows exactly what targets to exploit.
2.1.3.4 Countermeasures Summary.
The previously mentioned countermeasures should all be implemented as part
of a defense in depth strategy. Yet, all of the protection provided is still not enough to
significantly mitigate the insider threat. Given the many shapes and sizes that insider
attacks can have, the inability to detect attacks as they happen seems logical. Thus,
to further mitigate the insider threat, the most logical path is to pursue different
preventative measures.
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The most effective way to prevent an insider attack may be the most funda-
mental. At the people level, managers and leaders must observe their team members’
behaviors well and give them extra attention when they need it; it is hypothesized
that it is possible to prevent insider attacks from happening with simple human inter-
vention [28]. Unfortunately, getting managers to know their teams well is sometimes
difficult.
In plain terms, it is expected that a manager can characterize the behavior
of each individual subordinate, be able to detect a change in an individual, monitor
behavior, intervene if necessary. The problem is that managers don’t often know their
teams well, not because they are bad managers, but because it is difficult to do so
in today’s work environments. Managers often supervise teams that are separated
geographically and the problem of knowing teammates is compounded because many
technical workers are introverts [30].
In all, current countermeasures are hindered by the lack of characteristics or
tendencies shared insiders. If this knowledge is known, managers can look for these
characteristics in their subordinates and take the necessary action.
2.1.4 Characterizing the Insider Threat.
This section discusses different classifications of insider attacks and insiders,
and explain why characterization and targeting malicious insiders with preventative
measures are good strategies for mitigating the insider threat. Characterizing the
insider threat means learning who the insider is, what the attack is, and why the
insider attacks.
Characterizing the insider threat is difficult because there is limited data and
literature on insider attacks. There is limited information because many companies
do not report insider attacks in order to minimize negative attention and monetary
loss. Moreover, the company would just invite more attacks on systems that appear
to be vulnerable. CSI/FBI reports that more than half (Fig. 3) of companies did not
report that they were subject to insider attacks. [27]
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Figure 3: Reporting Cyberattacks in 2004 [27]
Thankfully, studies have been done with the data reported to the authorities.
Along with the CSI/FBI yearly study, the U.S. Secret Service (SS) and the CERT
Coordination Center did a case study on insider incidents in the banking and finance
sector, and Shaw did extensive research on insiders.
2.1.4.1 SS/CERT Study.
The U.S. Secret Service and the CERT Coordination Center (SS/CERT) did
a case study on insider incidents in the banking and finance sector, areas that have
always placed a strong emphasis on security. However, these companies in these
sectors were still the victims of malicious insider attacks. Thus, SS/CERT studied
the incidents and published their findings [25].
In the study, SS/CERT found that the perpetrators did not share a common
profile in terms of age, gender, marital status, employment position. They also found
that few of the insiders were considered by management or co-workers as difficult to
manage, untrustworthy, or were perceived to be disgruntled employees.
SS/CERT found that incidents were carried out by non-technical workers and
required little or no technical sophistication. Very few cases even used scripts or
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programs; a signature-based IDS would not detect these kinds of attack. In fact,
most of the attacks were manually detected by people who were not responsible for
security.
Central to this thesis, SS/CERT found that 81% of perpetrators planned their
actions in advance. A planned incident can be stopped in the planning phase, whereas
it is more difficult to stop a spur-of-the-moment crime. And of the cases documented,
39% of insiders had come to the attention of either a supervisor and/or coworker for
some concerning behavior prior to the incident. Examples of these behaviors include
increasing complaints to supervisors regarding salary dissatisfaction, increased cell
phone use at the office, refusal to work with new supervisors, increased outbursts
directed at coworkers, and isolation from coworkers. If there is any trend in the
behavior of insiders, this is it: the perpetrators plan and exhibit changes in behavior.
Thus, if it is possible to find changes in behavior during the planning phase, it is
possible to prevent an insider attack.
2.1.4.2 Shaw’s Studies.
Dr. Eric Shaw produced some seminal research on the insider threat. Though
his primary focus is on the technically-skilled worker, his findings, especially those
about the feasibility of preventing insider attacks, echo those from SS/CERT.
Shaw describes a specific kind of insider, the Critical Information Technology
Insider (CITI) [30]. A CITI is an employee whose job deals directly with critical
computer systems. These information technology specialists’ job functions elevate
them well above the average end-user in terms of skill, access and potential damage.
Shaw created a typology of eight categories that the motivations of the perpetra-
tors fell into. Explorers, mostly harmless, are curious users who wander into the wrong
areas in a network. Good Samaritans are willing to put aside rules to get the job done
better. Hackers are motivated to show off and boost their self-esteem. Machiavel-
lians use corporate systems to advance their careers. Avengers seek vengeance, career
thieves use computer systems to make money, and moles are spies. Since these moti-
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vations are broad and difficult to detect without human interpretation, it is difficult
to classify insiders on motivation.
Shaw also identified six personal characteristics with direct implications for risk.
They often have a history of personal and social frustrations, computer dependency,
ethical “flexibility,” reduced loyalty, a sense of entitlement, and a lack of empathy [29].
These characteristics are difficult to detect without a good personal knowledge of the
subject. Moreover, no insider would openly admit to these characteristics. Again,
good managerial practices and close interaction with employees is key to identification
of these characteristics.
Shaw notes that acute situational stressors can trigger an emotional reaction
leading to impaired judgment and reckless or vindictive behavior. Examples of acute
situational stressors are marital or family problems, episodes of substance abuse, dis-
appointments at work, threatened layoffs, or other stressful life events [30]. Shaw
reports that if warning signs like acute situational stressors are detected, managers
have a time frame in which to intervene and prevent an insider attack. While many
cases first appear to involve disgruntled employees who execute a single massive attack
after receiving dramatic news, perceiving a slight, or suffering a setback, closer ex-
amination of the case histories reveals that many employees demonstrated clear signs
of disgruntlement and committed less serious violations leading up to the ultimate
act [28]. This suggests that the most devastating attacks could have been prevented
if the early indications of dissatisfaction had been recognized or taken more seriously.
This information again places the burden upon the manager to be well-informed.
In many cases, supervisors were aware of insider attacks but did not appreciate
their significance. There were also many cases in which the managers were unaware
of their subordinates’ changing behaviors. Shaw concludes that there is a strong need
for supervisor training, improved communications with security, and independent
channels by which security can monitor risk situations, other than via supervisor
notification [29].
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2.1.4.3 Mitigating the Insider Threat.
Given the difficulty of detecting the insider threat with the defense-in-depth
methodology and the best available tools, the insider threat is best mitigated through
good managerial practices in which supervisors are in close contact with their sub-
ordinates and have a good communication line with security. Managers and security
personnel would be able to mitigate the insider threat more effectively if they had more
useful information about their employees’ behavior. This need for more information
can potentially be met with social network analysis.
2.2 Social Network Analysis
“The truth lies within the social fabric that connects people to people
and people to content.” – Peter Morville [21]
Figure 4: Sociogram of AFIT, from August 10-15 drawn by MAGE [26]
Social Network Analysis draws from the fields of Psychology and Sociology, to
study people and the relationships between groups of people [35]. While it is generally
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easier for a sociologist to study individuals and their attributes, the ultimate goal
of a sociologist is to understand the society itself: relationships within a group of
social entities and how they affect the individuals. This is the social network analysis
perspective.
The roots of social network analysis come from the work of J.L. Moreno, who
introduced the sociogram, a picture of the interpersonal structure of a group in 1934.
Moreno, considered the father of social network analysis brought forth the approach
called sociometry. Recognition that sociograms could be used to study social structure
led to a rapid introduction of analytic techniques. Much of the social network analysis
work that is known today came out interdisciplinary efforts thanks to the broad appeal
of the social network perspective [35].
Social network analysis is an interdisciplinary behavioral science specialty. It
is grounded in the simple, plainly obvious observation that social actors are inter-
dependent and that the links among them have important consequences for every
individual. In social network analysis, the relational ties between actors are primary
and the attributes of actors are secondary.
Wasserman describes social network analysis as a “distinct research perspec-
tive within the social and behavioral sciences; distinct because social network analy-
sis is based on an assumption of the importance of relationships among interacting
units” [35]. Instead of focusing on the attributes of the individuals as is done in
standard social analysis, social network analysis focuses on ties, the interactions and
relationships between the individuals as a way of characterizing their behavior. When
social network analysts study ties, they interpret their functioning in the light of the
actors’ relations with other network members [10].
2.2.0.4 Social Network Data.
For example, a standard sociological study on the importance of individuals in
an organization might count the number of phone calls each individual makes and
receives and take into account the attributes of the callers, like age and gender as
18
Name Gender Age Calls
Andre M 34 18
Beverly F 32 17
Carol F 49 9
Diane F 19 32
Ed M 54 10
Fernando M 30 19
Garth M 24 22
Heather F 55 7
Ike M 43 6
Jane F 64 4
Table 1: Example of Standard Sociometric Data
shown in Table 1. The study then concludes by hypothesizing a relationship between
the attributes and the measured importance of the sample.
On the other hand, a social network approach analyzes who is calling whom
and the groups that are formed as a result. A secretary, for example, may make a lot
of phone calls, but is not necessarily the most important person in the organization.
The social network perspective looks at the relationships between the actors and then
tries to unearth how actors are structured relative to each other. Simple network data
is composed of actors, the entities being studied, and ties, representing a relationship
between actors. Social network data is often displayed in an adjacency matrix as
shown in Table 2.
This data is a sociogram or social network map and is the fundamental unit of
study in social network analysis [9]. In Table 2, the presence of a 1 at (x, y) in the
matrix represents the presence of a tie between the two actors x and y. Since there
is a 1 where row C and column F intersect, actor C has a relationship with actor F .
Notice that there is no mention of the attributes of the actors in this data. In this
example, the data is binary: each tie is either 0 or 1. The data does not necessarily
have to be this way as the strength of the tie can also be used. For example, actor F
is connected to actor D with a tie strength or weight of 7 in Table 3. Also, not every
tie in must be reciprocated (a tie between A and B is present if a tie between B and
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A B C D E F G H I J
A - 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
B 1 - 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
C 1 0 - 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
D 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 0 0 0
E 0 1 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 0
F 1 0 1 1 0 - 1 1 0 0
G 0 1 0 1 1 1 - 1 0 0
H 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 - 1 0
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -
Table 2: Example of an Undirected, Binary Sociogram, Social Network Data of an
Organization [17]
A B C D E F G H I J
A - 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
B 1 - 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0
C 5 0 - 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
D 1 2 1 - 1 1 1 0 0 0
E 0 1 0 1 - 0 1 0 0 0
F 1 0 1 7 0 - 1 1 0 0
G 0 9 0 1 1 2 - 1 0 0
H 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 - 3 0
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 1
J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -
Table 3: Example of a Directed, Weighted Sociogram, Social Network Data of an
Organization [17]
A is present) as is shown in Table 2; it is not difficult to imagine if the relationship is
directional, like “owes money to.”
From the matrix, it is possible to construct a visualization of the actors’ rela-
tionships with each other by making each actor a node in a graph and drawing an
edge between them if a relation exists. This visualization can show the structure of
relationships as shown in Figure 5.
As they are intrinsically graphs, sociograms adhere to the rules of graph theory.
Graph theory is very useful in social network analysis because it provides a vocabulary
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Figure 5: Sociogram data in graphical form [17]
to label and denote social structural properties. It also gives social network analysts
the tools used in studying graph theory: mathematical operations and concepts that
quantify and measure structural properties. Perhaps most importantly, giving social
networks a rigorous, symbolic representation means that the power of computers can
be leveraged to aid in research.
2.2.1 Social Network Analysis Capabilities.
Before the widespread availability of computers, the fruits of labor of a lengthy
interview or observational study were tedious arithmetic to calculate metrics of the
social network data and analyze them. Even more work is required to create a visual-
ization for the social structure. Computers have changed the speed of social network
analysis dramatically.
Social network analysis programs like UCINet [4], Pajek [3], and KrackPlot [14]
can calculate the properties of a graph with a few clicks of a mouse [10]. These
programs use graph theory algorithms and concepts to quickly calculate social network
metrics.
The primary goal of social network analysis is to understand the actors based
on their relationships. Understanding the actors means gaining information about
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the tendencies of the actors and being able to predict the attributes of the actors as
well as the actions the actors would take if ties or actors were to disappear. The basic
metrics of social network analysis revolve around activity, betweenness, and closeness.
Activity is often measured in terms of degrees, the number of ties that an actor has.
Betweenness is a measure of how many shortest paths between two actors go through
a specific actor. Closeness is a measure of how few connections are required to connect
to other actors. These basic social network concepts are used to calculate almost all
of the social network metrics and gain information about the entire network as well
as the actors themselves.
With the right parameters and usage, the metrics of social network analysis may
one day be used to help mitigate the insider threat. Since these metrics correspond to
the behavior of users, a change in these measurable metrics indicate a change in user
behavior. If these changes in behavior are indicative of potential insider behavior, the
user’s supervisor can be notified and an insider attack may be averted. Currently,
many different applications and uses of analysis on social network data have been
proposed and implemented. Some intriguing and effective uses were to improve the
productivity of organizations, optimizing the use of routers, and tracking terrorists.
2.2.1.1 Organizational Network Analysis.
Rob Cross of the University of Virginia uses social network analysis to analyze
organizational networks and help improve company productivity by increasing collab-
oration and information flow [7]. Fundamental to Organizational Network Analysis
(ONA) is the idea that people work well when they work together, and even better
when the right people are connected. Social network analysis find bottlenecks of in-
formation flow, organizational hermits who are not collaborating, and elitist groups
that don’t interact with those outside of the group. With the information he acquires,
Cross recommends ways to restructure or join groups through meetings or the hir-
ing of mediators. Among other things, ONA has been used to help integrate newly
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merged companies, improve strategic decision making in top leadership, and promote
creative thought.
Given its results, ONA is very effective, as some of Cross’ most prominent clients
are: American Express, Accenture, Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), Abbey National, A D
Little, Aventis, Bank of Montreal, BP, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Capital One, Cardinal
Healthcare, Conoco, CSC, Eli Lilly, EnCana, FAA, Halliburton, IBM, Intel, Mars,
Martha Jefferson Hospital, McKinsey, Microsoft, Nortel, Novartis, NSA, PriceWater-
house [7].
2.2.1.2 The Social Life of Routers.
Vladis Krebs showed that social network analysis ideas can help routers opti-
mize their connections in a network topology [15]. Optimal connections in a network
topology mean that the hop count (number of intermediate steps required to connect
two routers) between all routers is minimized. This has excellent application, espe-
cially for cable companies with which there is a large cost associated with laying cable
and connecting different nodes. Since the idea of a relational tie in a social network
is analogous to a connection between two routers in a computer network and hop
counts are calculated the same way that geodesic distance is calculated, Krebs turns
the topology of a computer network into a sociogram and takes some social network
analysis metrics.
This use of social network analysis is a simple exercise in graph theory and
results of this experiment were as expected: social network metrics were able to
determine which connections were most important in the computer network.
2.2.1.3 PieSpy: IRC and Shakespeare.
A clever program called PieSpy [22] monitors the messages in an internet relay
chat (IRC) chatroom and gathers social networking data on the fly. This method of
data gathering can be used to glean social networking data out of dialogues and was
tuned to gather data from Shakespearean plays as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Social Network Data from Antony and Cleopatra Gathered by PieSpy [22]
PieSpy, while seemingly trivial, demonstrates the capability of creating social
network data very quickly by mining a history of CMCs.
2.2.1.4 Traversing Social Networks and Mining Data from Email.
Hewlett-Packard Laboratories did research on finding the best methodologies in
searching social networks [1]. In the research, “small world” or local search heuristics
were compared to informed global search heuristics, and no social network analysis
was performed on the data. It was found that in general, it is faster to pass a message
by sending the message to an actor most similar in attributes to the intended recipient
than to the adjacent actor with the highest degree.
What was most interesting about this research was how social network data
from was created from email logs. Email logs are a readily available source of data
when given the permission of the users. No further information is given about the
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methods they used to gather the network data from the email logs, nor the format or
any specifications of the email logs. Regardless, mining email logs is a viable method
social network data collection and warrants further study.
2.2.1.5 Uncloaking Terrorist Networks.
Krebs also used social network analysis to “uncloak terrorist networks” after the
terrorist attacks of 2001 [16]. By gathering data from news articles that followed the
attacks, Krebs was able to construct a sociogram representing the terrorist network
as shown in Figure 7.
After some investigation, it was alleged that Mohammed Atta was the leader of
the covert operation. Krebs took the network centrality metrics of degree, closeness,
and betweenness, and found that Atta had the highest score for all three metrics.
These social network metrics support the idea that he is the leader of the operation.
Before jumping to conclusions, Krebs is careful to warn that social network
analysis is not necessarily a detector of criminals. However, social network analysis
can help determine structure and importance of members of a society.
2.2.1.6 Potential Insider Threat Mitigation.
Studying user behavior based on social network analysis metrics could poten-
tially provide means of characterizing the insider threat. Changes in social network
analysis metrics indicate a change in an actor’s email messaging behavior. As Shaw
writes, a change in behavior may be indicative of a potential insider threat [30].
Some social network analysis metrics that may be useful are Freeman Den-
sity, Bonacich Power, and k-cores. These metrics are standard in the social network
analysis software programs UCINet and Pajek. Freeman Density is a measure of the
centrality of an actor based on the number of actors connected to it. Bonacich Power
is a metric taken to demonstrate the ability of social network analysis to provide infor-
mation about actor power and centrality. A k-core is a loose group of actors in which
25
more tightly-knit groups of actors are found. Additionally, analyzing the changes to
a specific actor’s ego network also indicates changes to an actor’s behavior. [11].
2.2.2 Difficulty in Gathering Social Network Data.
While the information that social network analysis can provide is helpful, gath-
ering social network data is a difficult task. Gathering social network data is even
more difficult when dealing with large populations and over protracted periods of
time. Standard methods of data collection include conducting interviews/surveys,
observing the actors, or extracting data from archived records.
The interview or survey-based approach to collecting data is extremely time
consuming and not possible in all situations. Interviews and surveys inconvenience
the people being studied (and can potentially invade their privacy), especially if they
need to be repeated for a longitudinal study. Additionally, the questions asked are
fairly simple and are only taken in one context. Further, these questions themselves
often lead to bounding the number of connections, sometimes asking to name only
a certain number [18]. In addition, these questions often do not capture the relative
weight of the relationship and only the presence of a tie. Moreover, resources must
be expended to carry out the interviews and surveys. The Network Roundtable at
the University of Virginia developed a tool that can generate social network data
from the results of customizable online surveys. While this expedites the process,
it still requires user interaction and is only as accurate as the person filling out the
survey [34].
Resources required to observe a social structure with people are especially high
and time consuming. Observation often requires getting the permission of those stud-
ied, a permission that is not always granted. Moreover, the observers can only gather
so much information, and this method of data collection works best when studying
relatively small groups of people with close interaction [35].
On the other hand, the cost of gleaning social network data from archived infor-
mation requires no intense observation of live subjects. Information can be gathered
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from lots of different sources such as newspapers, attendance records, or email traf-
fic [16]. Gathering data from recorded archives is done in a short period of time as
opposed to gathering data as it happens, making it much easier to perform longitudi-
nal studies. However, it does require time to read the archived data and get out the
important information. Moreover, as archives are records of the past, they often do
not provide information about the current social structure [35]. In terms of poten-
tially mitigating the insider threat, collecting data archives is a viable option if the
data can be collected and analyzed in a timely manner.
2.3 Summary
The insider threat is a significant risk that costs businesses millions of dollars
annually. Current tools are inadequate and and research efforts toward mitigating its
risk show that it is very difficult and potentially impossible to detect or characterize
malicious insiders. The best method of mitigating the risk of the insider threat is
through prevention and keeping pertinent information about employees.
The study of social networks has profoundly influenced the fields of mathemat-
ics, statistics, and economics as well as the fields of sociology, and psychology [35].
Social network analysis can provide useful information about a network and the actors
within it. It is believed that the use of computers can make social network analysis
feasible and potentially aid in mitigating the insider threat. While the impact of so-
cial network analysis on mitigating the insider threat remains to be seen, no studies
can be done without social network data.
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Figure 7: Krebs’ Mapping of the 2001 Terrorist Network [16]
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III. System Implementation
The objective of this research is to show that the creation of useful social network
data from Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) data in a time-efficient manner is
possible.
3.1 Overview
It is possible to automatically create social network data that can be read and
analyzed by current social network analysis tools. The metrics gathered by these tools
may prove useful to social network analysts in characterizing organizational behavior.
These characterizations can be used in a tool to provide supervisors more information
about their subordinates. Since human behavior is reflected in email usage, future
research may show that good social network data can be mined from SMTP logs.
Creating social network data from readily available SMTP logs is cheaper than
taking surveysconducted on company time. The automatic creation of social network
data also allows social network analysts to study the short-term dynamics of a large
set of actors, impossible to do with current social network data gathering methods.
Unfortunately, it is unknown how quickly a system can create social network data
with these methods.
This chapter describes the proof of concept system developed to achieve research
objectives and covers the development of the system, the system components, and the
operation of the system.
3.1.1 System Overview.
To create social network data from SMTP logs, data is gathered, filtered and/or
parsed, and mined for information. If privacy is required, the data can also be
anonymized. The process enumerated below is illustrated in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: System Process and Components
1. Gather SMTP/Active Directory data with MS Exchange
2. Enumerate Users with a Proxy List
3. Sanitize Data by Assigning Unique Identifiers
4. Process Sanitized Data for a Database Import
5. Import Processed Data and Generate Social Network Data
Pre-existing tools are used to perform the first step as SMTP logs and user
information are generated automatically by Microsoft Exchange and are extracted
with Javelina’s Advantage. To be useful, the output from the system is readable by
current social network analysis software like UCINet or Pajek, as it is far too time-
consuming to perform social network analysis on a network of over 1000 actors by
hand.
Thus, to achieve the goals of this research, a system that performs the missing
steps of the process is implemented. As specified above, the generation of useful social
network data from SMTP logs requires components that provide the following four ser-
vices:
1. Assign UIDs to Users with a Proxy List
2. Sanitize Logs by Replacing Usernames with UIDs
3. Process Sanitized Logs for Database Import
4. Database Functions to Import Data and Generate Social Network Data
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Each of these functions are encapsulated in a component implemented for the
purposes of this research as shown in Figure 9. The ProxyListToUID, SMTPLogSanitizer,
and SMTPLogParserprograms are written in Java 1.50 and require Java JRE version
1.5. Queries are made with MySQL version 4.1. Microsoft Exchange and Javelina
ADVantage generate the proxy list file proxy.csv and the SMTP logs. The imple-
mented ProxyListToUID component assigns a unique identification number (UID)
to each user as denoted by a proxy list. The implemented SMTPLogSanitizer com-
ponent sanitizes the logs by replacing user names with UIDs. The implemented
SMTPLogParser processes the sanitized logs and creates database importable infor-
mation. Finally, database functions import the data from the SMTPLogParser and
generate social network data that are readable by current social network analysis
programs.
3.1.2 Expected Usage.
The system is expected to be given a fresh set of SMTP logs every week or month
to sanitize, process, and add to the database. This relatively short time interval
ensures that the social network data recorded is current and thus presents a more
accurate description of the behavior of the system users.
3.1.3 Privacy Protection.
To protect the privacy of users, access to certain sensitive files must be con-
trolled. This system was created with the assumption that the organization whose
Figure 9: System Implementation
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email traffic generated the original SMTP log data is planning to give either the san-
itized data or the parsed-sanitized data to an external party. This external party is
expected to analyze the generated social network data. The organization owning the
original SMTP data can possess all of the data objects created.
This access scheme to protect the privacy of users is shown in Figure 10, where
sensitive files that could violate the privacy of users are in shaded boxes. These boxed
files are not to be accessed by external parties.
In summary, access to data objects should be given as follows:
• Private Data, exclusive to Owner of SMTP Data
– SMTP Logs
– proxylist.csv
– uidlist.csv
• Sanitized Public Data, External Entities can Possess
– Sanitized SMTP Logs
– Parsed-sanitized Logs
– Databases/Social Network Data
3.2 Gather SMTP and ProxyList Data
Correctly formatted SMTP log data is mined for information. Setting up a
Microsoft Exchange server to gather SMTP data for this experiment is simple. The
Figure 10: File Permission to Protect Privacy
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SMTP log files are in the NCSA Common Log File format and become the input for
the sanitization component.
3.2.1 Input.
Outlook Exchange Server, Exchange System Manager
3.2.2 Output.
Directory of *.log files.
3.2.3 Proxy List.
The proxy list file proxy.csv is generated using the Javelina ADVantage tool.
This tool goes through the Active Directory and gathers the aliases, emails addresses,
and X400 information about every user and creates output as shown in Figure 11.
3.3 ProxyListToUID Component
The ProxyListToUID component resolves the multiple aliases of an actor to a
specific actor. For example, a user in the system named Jason Yee might use both
the email addresses jyee@afit.edu and jason.yee@afit.edu . This component
assigns the same identity to the two different email addresses. While this is not
possible for outsiders to the system, it is definitely possible to identify users in an
Yee Jason 2dLt AFIT/ENG,Jason.Yee@afit.edu,
"X400:c=US;a= ;p=AFIT;o=HANGAR;s=Yee;g=Jason;
smtp:jyee@afit.edu
SMTP:Jason.Yee@afit.edu"
"Smith John A Civ AFIT/SC",John.Smith@afit.edu,
"X400:c=US;a= ;p=AFIT;o=HANGAR;s=Smith;g=John;
smtp:jasmith@afit.edu
smtp:jsmith1@afit.edu
SMTP:John.Smith@afit.edu
SMTP:John.Smith.1@afit.edu"
...
Figure 11: Proxy List File Format
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email system. This information can be gathered from the Active Directory using a
tool called ADVantage from Javelina Software.
This user information can be used to assign a unique identification number
(UID) to each individual user in the system. It is important to understand that a
UID is meant to correspond to a single human user. It is essential to identify unique
users if social network analysis results are expected to be accurate. This is something
that is taken for granted when carrying out interviews and surveys to gather social
network data.
The ProxyListToUID program assigns a unique user identification number (UID)
to each listed user. Extra email aliases are mapped to the same UID.
3.3.1 Usage.
The one argument required to call the ProxyListToUIDis the full path to the
proxy.csv file. From the folder containing the class files, enter:
java ProxyListToUID ‘‘c:\full-path-to\proxy.csv’’
3.3.2 Input.
The ProxyListToUID program requires a proxy list file proxy.csv as input.
The proxy list file should contain entries of all of the users with the form:
DisplayName,EmailAddress,ProxyAddresses
Figure 12: ProxyListToUID Component
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An example of an entry is shown in Figure 11. This is the same format used
in exporting Active Directory contents by Javelina’s ADVantage tool. The string for
the proxy file follows Microsoft convention and may therefore have spaces. Thus, the
string should include quotation marks.
3.3.3 Output.
The ProxyListToUID program produces the UID list file uidlist.csv as a list
of user IDs assigned to email addresses. The uidlist.csv file in the form:
UniqueID,EmailAddress
The correct output for the sample input in Figure 11 is shown in Figure 13. It is
important to note that the output file uidlist.csv is considered private information
that can be used to un-sanitize the data.
0,Jason.Yee@afit.edu
0,jyee@afit.edu
1,John.Smith@afit.edu
1,jasmith@afit.edu
1,jsmith1@afit.edu
1,John.Smith.1@afit.edu
...
Figure 13: Format of UID list
When the program is run in a terminal window, it will display the name of the
file, number of email addresses imported, and the time it took as shown in Figure 14.
Converting "proxy.csv" to UID list
uidlist.csv
uidlist.csv created
282ms to complete.
Figure 14: Terminal Output for ProxyListToUID
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3.4 SMTPLogSanitizer Component
For the purposes of this research, specific identities were not required nor desired.
Thus, before the SMTP logs are analyzed, they are sanitized. The sanitization process
used in this research makes SMTP logs relatively safe for distribution by replacing the
user name of an email address with a number, thus masking the identity of the user.
While it is possible to also hide the domain name, that information was retained so
that other researchers are able to determine which users are internal and external to
the system. It is important to note that NCSA formatted SMTP logs do not contain
any information about the subject or content of the email message. Thus, an SMTP
log is considered sanitized if the user names are anonymized.
The SMTPLogSanitizer program keeps a record of the email addresses already
seen and the number of unique users identified. If the log sanitizer finds an email
address that it has already seen, it replaces that email address with the UID associated
with it. If the log sanitizer finds an email address that it has not seen, it generates a
new UID, assigns it to the email address, and replaces the email address with the UID.
The log sanitizer program SMTPLogSanitizer was built with those requirements.
To ensure correct performance, it is extremely important that a record of which
UID corresponds to which email address is kept. Otherwise, running the SMTPLogSanitizer
on another log file may assign different email addresses the same UID, defeating the
purpose of UIDs.
Figure 15: SMTPLogSanitizer Component
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3.4.1 Usage.
If a the ProxyListToUID output file uidlist.csv is available, move it into the
folder containing SMTPLogSanitizer class files. SMTPLogSanitizer looks for a file
named uidlist.csv in its working directory; if no file is found, a new user ID list is
created. Enter this command to run the program:
java SMTPLogSanitizer ‘‘c:\full-path-to\SMTPLogs\’’
3.4.2 Input.
SMTPLogSanitizer takes a folder containing *.log files as explicit input. The
file uidlist.csv is implicitly input. This component will find all *.log files in
the folder and create sanitized versions of them, as well as update the UID list file
uidlist.csv with the new addresses in the log files.
3.4.3 Output.
The SMTPLogSanitizer program sanitizes each *.log file by replacing the
user portion of all email addresses with a UID. For instance, if the email address
joe.user@afit.edu is not in the UID list, it will be replaced with 27182@afit.edu
in the sanitized log file if 27182 is the next UID generated. The new association
between the email address and a UID is added to the UID list uidlist.csv located
in the working directory.
If the email addresses jane.user@afit.edu and juser@afit.edu are both as-
signed the UID 3141 by the ProxyListToUID program, either occurrence is replaced
with 3141@afit.edu in the sanitized log.
A new file with all of the substitutions is created with the filename s_ concate-
nated in front of the original file name. This file is placed in the SanitizedLogs
subfolder of the working directory, and the original *.log file is unchanged.
The SMTPLogSanitizer program outputs information to the terminal about the
speed and size of read files. File name, lines in the file, time taken to sanitize the file,
speed, and number of UIDs are given as shown in Figure 16.
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01Nov.log
Reading 01Nov.log
. 1531256 lines read in 01Nov.log
. 177031ms, 8.649648931543062 lines/ms
. 23363 new UIDs added, 24913 total
UIDs
Figure 16: Terminal Output for SMTPLogSanitizer
For example, the sanitization of file 2004-10.log results in a file named s_2004-10.log
in the SanitizedLogs subfolder of the folder the SMTPLogSanitizer class files are
in, as well as an update of the UID list uidlist.csv.
Now that sanitized copies of the logs have been created, they are used without
fear of invasion of privacy. The SanitizedLogs folder can be distributed, while the
original SMTP logs and the UID list uidlist.csv are to remain secured by the system
administrators.
3.4.4 Implementation Notes.
The SMTPLogSanitizer program requires a persistent store for the the email
addresses and the UIDs that they correspond to. The current form stores this data in
plaintext in the file uidlist.csv. When this program is called, the UID list is parsed
and imported into a hashtable, and before the program exits, the contents of the
hashtable are rewritten to the UID list. As a result, SMTPLogSanitizer is reusable.
An issue with the SMTPLogSanitizer is the presence of invalid email addresses,
which are not sanitized. Valid email addresses have a username, the ’@’ character,
and top level domain or country code like .com, .net, or co.uk. Email addresses
must consist of the alphanumeric characters and the characters ’.’, ’_’, ’%’, and ’-’.
Invalid email addresses contain incorrect characters in the user name such as ’"’, ’’’,
’/’, ’+’, or ’=’; these are most likely the result of poorly written scripts.
These invalid email addresses are ignored in this implementation, but the code
can easily be changed to have them discarded. Since invalid email addresses are not
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accepted by the next component and incorporated in the social network data, they
are not considered to be an issue.
3.5 SMTPLogParser Component
The SMTPLogParser component extracts data from SMTP logs that are im-
ported into a database. Useful information from SMTP logs are the date and time an
email was sent, the sender and recipient, if the sender and recipient are internal, and
how many recipients received the same email. This information is used by the data-
base to generate social network data. The SMTPLogParser program was developed to
extract such data from sanitized NCSA formatted SMTP logs.
To respect the privacy of the email users, this extraction process is done on
sanitized logs where the sender and recipient are numbers and the domain name is
used only to determine the internal or external status of the user
3.5.1 Usage.
The one argument required to call the SMTPLogParser program is the full path
to a folder containing sanitized logs. From the folder containing the class files, enter:
java SMTPLogParser‘‘c:\full-path-to\SanitzedLogs\’’
3.5.2 Input.
The files in the input folder must be sanitized logs. This means that all email ad-
Figure 17: SMTPLogParser Component
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dresses in the files must be in the form of <UID>@domain. The path to a SanitizedLogs
folder created by the SMTPLogSanitizer program will work perfectly.
3.5.3 Output.
The SMTPLogParser program parses the contents of each sanitized log file and
and extracts the date, time, sender UID, recipient UID, whether the sender and
recipient are internal, and the number of recipients in the email. For example, the
input of Figure 18 results in the output shown in Figure 19
129.92.1.65 - OutboundConnectionCommand [09/Dec/2004:08:01:17 -0500]
"MAIL -?FROM:<2718@afit.edu> SMTP" 0 4
129.92.1.65 - OutboundConnectionResponse [09/Dec/2004:08:01:17 -0500]
"- -?250 2.1.0 2718@afit.edu....Sender OK SMTP" 0 43
129.92.1.65 - OutboundConnectionCommand [09/Dec/2004:08:01:17 -0500]
"RCPT -?TO:<1828@afit.edu> SMTP" 0 4
129.92.1.65 - OutboundConnectionCommand [09/Dec/2004:08:01:17 -0500]
"RCPT -?TO:<4590@ieee.org> SMTP" 0 4
Figure 18: Sample Sanitized Log Input for SMTPLogParser
2004/12/09 08:01:17 2718 1828 1
1 2
2004/12/09 08:01:17 2718 4590 1
0 2
Figure 19: SMTPLogParser Output for the Sample in Figure 18
The columns in the output correspond to the date, time, sender UID, recipient
UID, internal status of sender (1 if internal, 0 if external), internal status of recipient,
and the number of recipients. The internal status will be 1 if the domain is as specified
(afit.edu in this case) and 0 otherwise.
Terminal output shows the time taken, speed of parsing, and the number of
messages read per file and the total time taken to parse all files as shown in Figure
20.
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s 01Nov.log Reading s 01Nov.log
70797ms, 13.091190304673926
lines/ms . 195930 messages
recorded ... 1397954ms to
complete.
Figure 20: Terminal Output for SMTPLogParser
3.5.4 Implementation Notes.
The original component did not include a way to count the number of recipients
per message. The current version counts the number of valid recipients. The number
of recipients is counted so that “spam” or “mass-emails” are ignored.
As written, AFIT is hard-coded in to determine what email addresses are inter-
nal. This can easily be changed in the source code by changing the INTERNAL DOMAIN vari-
able.
The SMTPLogParser depends on the SMTPLogSanitizer to assign the same UID
to the different addresses of each user. SMTPLogParser will parse whatever data is
given: it is recommended that the SMTPLogSanitizer program is used to sanitize the
data.
Multiple instances of the SMTPLogParser component can be run in parallel to
process data. This can greatly expedite the processing of sanitized SMTP log data.
3.6 Database Functions Component
The processed information provided the needed information to create social
network data. All that remains is to setup the database, import the data from the
processed logs, and export the query results.
3.6.1 Database Setup.
Before importing the data, a table carrying the values is created. The fields in
the table are the same as the fields created by the SMTPLogParser program including
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a primary key:
• MessageID (database key)
• Date
• Time
• UID of Sender
• UID of Recipient
• Internal status of Sender
• Internal status of Recipient
• Number of Recipients of Message
The query used to create the message table as described above is shown in
Figure 22. Creating the table needs to be done only once.
3.6.2 Importing Data into Message Table.
When the database and required table is prepared, the data extracted by the
SMTPLogParser is imported. The query used to import data is shown in Figure 23.
3.6.3 Creating Sociograms.
Finally, social network data that is analyzed by UCINet is extracted from the
SMTPLogParser generated data in the database. This is a two-step process that
requires a query and the addition of a header.
3.6.3.1 SQL Query Results.
In the first step, a MySQL query is made and the results are exported. By
Figure 21: Database FunctionsComponent
42
### Create EmailMessageLog create table
‘emailmessagelog‘.‘EmailMessageLog‘ (
‘MessageID‘ int NOT NULL AUTO INCREMENT
, ‘Date‘ date NOT NULL , ‘Time‘ time
NOT NULL , ‘SenderUID‘ mediumint NOT
NULL , ‘RecipientUID‘ mediumint NOT
NULL , ‘InternalSender‘ bool NOT NULL
, ‘InternalRecipient‘ bool NOT NULL ,
‘NumRecipients‘ mediumint NOT NULL , PRIMARY
KEY ( ‘MessageID‘ ) )
Figure 22: SQL Query to Create Email Message Table
### Import Parsed-Sanitized Log
load data local infile ’ps*.txt’
into table emailmessagelog
fields escaped by ’\\’
terminated by ’\t’
lines terminated by ’\n’
(
‘Date‘,
‘Time‘,
‘SenderUID‘,
‘RecipientUID‘,
‘InternalSender‘,
‘InternalRecipient‘,
‘NumRecipients‘
)
Figure 23: SQL Query to Import Data from SMTPLogParser
altering the query, different social network maps are generated. In this research,
the sociograms are exported with space-delimited fields. This is done easily with a
program like SQLYOG1. A sample of a sociogram extracted in UCINet edgelist format
without header information is shown in Figure 24.
There are many different ways to calculate tie strength, but for the purposes
of this experiment, tie strength is calculated as the number of email messages sent
from the sender to the recipient. For example, in Figure 24, actor 0 sent five emails
1SQLYOG exports in UNIX-formatted text and UCINet only accepts text in PC format
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0 1 5
0 2 14
0 3 16
1 0 8
1 3 13
2 1 11
2 3 6
3 2 12
...
<SenderUID> <RecipientUID> <TieStrength>
Figure 24: Exported Query Results
to actor 1 while actor 1 sent eight emails to actor 0. This is directed, non-symmetric
social network data.
Altering the query allows the user to create sociograms based on select data
extracted from the SMTP logs. Figures 28-31 show different MySQL queries and
describe the sociograms created.
3.6.3.2 Header Information.
The second step involves inserting the following header information at the be-
ginning of the file. The exported file is edited and the header shown in Figure 25 is
inserted before the data. UCINet will automatically calculate the number of distinct
actors so a specified number of actors (currently n = 1) can be input as shown.
dl
n = 1
format = edgelist
labels embedded
data:
Figure 25: Header for Top of Exported Query Results
Once this header is given, this file contains social network data in a mostly valid
DL format file. Upon importing this file into UCINet, an error message will pop up
as shown in Figure 26. This error message will determine what number of nodes, the
number that should replace the 1 currently in the header. In the case of Figure 26,
n = 1491. Given this information, the DL format file can be corrected as shown in
44
Figure 27. Now, UCINet can import and perform social network analysis upon this
valid social network data.
Figure 26: UCINet Import Error
dl
n = 1491
format = edgelist
labels embedded
data:
Figure 27: Header for Top of Exported Query Results with 1491 Nodes
3.7 Summary
This chapter described the proof of concept system developed to achieve research
objectives. The next chapter discusses the methodology used to test this system.
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SELECT SenderUID, RecipientUID, COUNT(*)
FROM emailmessagelog
GROUP BY SenderUID, RecipientUID
Figure 28: SQL Query to Create a Sociogram
SELECT SenderUID, RecipientUID, COUNT(*)
FROM emailmessagelog.emailmessagelog
WHERE InternalSender = 1 AND InternalRecipient = 1
GROUP BY SenderUID, RecipientUID
Figure 29: SQL Query to Create an Internal Sociogram
SELECT SenderUID, RecipientUID, COUNT(*)
FROM emailmessagelog.emailmessagelog
WHERE
InternalSender = 1
AND InternalRecipient = 1
AND Date BETWEEN "2004-09-01" AND "2004-09-31"
GROUP BY SenderUID, RecipientUID
Figure 30: SQL Query to Create an Internal Sociogram Limited by Date (September
2004)
SELECT SenderUID, RecipientUID, COUNT(*)
FROM emailmessagelog.emailmessagelog
WHERE
InternalSender = 1
AND InternalRecipient = 1
AND NumRecipients < 20
AND Date BETWEEN "2004-09-01" AND "2004-09-31"
GROUP BY SenderUID, RecipientUID
Figure 31: SQL Query to Create an Internal Sociogram Limited by Date (September
2004) and Number of Recipients (less than 20)
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IV. Experiment Methodology and Results
This chapter documents the experiment methodology and the test results gathered.
The second section discusses the results and findings of the experiment.
4.1 Experiment Methodology
The first section of this chapter describes the methodology of the experiments
used to test the system implemented as specified in the previous chapter.
4.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The intent of this research is to determine if the creation of useful social network
data from Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) data in a time-efficient manner is
possible. This experiment determines the time required to create useful social network
data out of readily-available SMTP logs and the usefulness of the generated data from
the system described in the previous chapter.
It is expected that social network data is generated in under a day, the approx-
imate time it takes to complete a computer-based survey. The social network data
generated is expected to be in a form usable by UCINet and is imported and analyzed
as described in the previous chapter. However, it is unknown exactly how long it takes
to generate the social network data.
4.1.2 Evaulation Metrics.
The metrics used to evaluate the social network data generating system in this
experiment are usefulness and timeliness.
The usefulness metric is the ability for the generated data to be read by the
standard social network analysis program UCINet. UCINet is the most commonly
used social network analysis program and files that can be read by UCINet can be
read by almost all other social network analysis programs like Pajek and NetDraw.
Thus, for this performance metric, if UCINet can take some standard social network
analysis metrics from the generated social network data, the system is useful.
47
The metric of usability has no connection with the quality of data. This is
primarily because no study on this kind of data has been done at the time of this
research. Additionally, it is not within the scope of this research to analyze the social
network metrics of the data.
The timeliness metric is the duration of time taken by each component to provide
its service and the overall time required to generate social network data. If the total
time to generate social network data is less than a day, the system’s performance is
considered to be good. Again, this is in comparison to the time required to gather
social network data from a computer-based survey.
For future application in mitigating the insider threat, the timeliness metric is
dependent on the “window of opportunity” within which a manager is able to prevent
an insider incident through intervention. To get useful and timely information to
a manager, the system must generate useful social network data (as determined by
social network analysts) within that time period.
4.1.3 System Boundaries.
The system under test is the system that generates useful social network data
through the process illustrated in Figure 32.
The scope of this experiment is limited to the process of creating useful social
network data in a timely manner. It does not include the systems that generate the
Figure 32: System Under Test
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original proxy lists and SMTP data (Microsoft Exchange/Javelina ADVantage) or
analyze the social network data (UCINet, NetDraw).
4.1.4 System Setup.
This testing is performed on a dedicated Dell Poweredge Pentium 4 hyperthreading-
enabled 3.2 GHz computer with 2 GB RAM and the Windows XP Professional Edition
operating system. The system tested is the same system implemented in the previous
chapter, with components developed in Java 1.5, and a MySQL 4.0.21 server.
4.1.5 Workload.
The workload in this research consists of a list of users and their different email
addresses and SMTP logs in the National Center for Supercomputing Applications
(NCSA) format [19]. To obtain realistic data for a medium-sized organization (1550
members), data was collected from AFIT’s Microsoft Exchange servers over 86 days
during the months of October, November, and December of 2004. The SMTP data
consists of approximately 3.6 gigabytes worth of text as shown in Figure 4.
October is the first month in the Fall quarter and relationships between students
and faculty are still forming. However, this quarter follows the primer courses given
in September so the students have had over a month to meet. Thus, in October,
relationships are somewhat formed and more stable. November and December are the
final two months in the Fall quarter and should exhibit generally similar behaviors.
The data provided is missing the last week in October because of a server crash.
Month Days Size
October 25 1,034,273 KB
November 30 1,385,098 KB
December 31 1,359,860 KB
Table 4: Data Size
4.1.5.1 ProxyListToUID Workload.
The ProxyListToUID component is tested with the proxy list created from
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AFIT’s Active Directory. This proxy list is 259 KB and contains the information for
1550 distinct users, each with multiple email aliases.
4.1.5.2 SMTPLogSanitizer Workload.
The SMTPLogSanitizer component is given the workload of three months of
SMTP data in the form of 12 separate log files in a directory. The UID list, the result
of the ProxyListToUID component is also part of the workload for this component.
4.1.5.3 SMTPLogParser Workload.
The SMTPLogParser component is given the workload of three months of san-
itized SMTP data in the form of 12 separate sanitized log files in a directory. These
sanitized logs are the output of the ProxyListToUID component.
4.1.5.4 Database Queries.
The database functions component is given the workload of importing three
months of processed SMTP log files, the output of the SMTPLogParser component.
The database then has a workload of 12 queries to create different sets of social
network data. These queries will vary by date range and restriction. The possible
date ranges and restrictions are as follows:
• Date Range
– October
– November
– December
– All months
• Restriction
– None
– Internal Only
– Internal Only and Number of Recipients less than 20
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4.1.6 Evaluation Technique.
First, the software is verified by testing and debugging, then validated on a
small data set. The small data set is small and the results of the test are validated
by hand. Then, the timeliness and usefulness of the system is evaluated by creating
social network data from a workload consisting of real data. The system is tested in a
the manner it is expected to operate, sanitizing and processing one month of SMTP
log data at a time. Times are gathered by direct measurement.
4.1.6.1 Verification of Components.
Verification that the components are performing correctly is tested by debugging
and white-box code walkthroughs.
Validation of the results is done by testing system with artificially-generated
SMTP data. The social network data of the artificial SMTP data is gathered manually
and is compared to the social network data automatically generated by the system.
The components are correct if they provide the expected output. This method of
evaluation is justified as no similar system with similar data has been implemented.
This portion of testing is done during the development of the system and will
not be reported in the results and findings.
4.1.6.2 Evaluating Timeliness.
The time used to generate social network data consists of direct measurement
of the durations of multiple runs of each component. The results cannot be validated
analytically or by simulation or as no system like this has been created.
To measure the runtimes, the full process of creating social network data out of
SMTP logs is repeated three times and the time spent on each component is recorded.
4.1.6.3 Usability of Social Network Data.
Validation of the usability of the social network data is evaluated by importing
it into UCINet and taking standard social network analysis metrics. The metrics
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taken are the Freeman Density, Bonacich Power, and k-Cores social network metrics.
Ego networks are also extracted.
These three metrics were chosen because they provide useful information on
monitoring the behavior individual users. Studying email messagaging behavior could
potentially provide means of characterizing the insider threat. Changes in these met-
rics indicate a change in an actor’s email messaging behavior. As Shaw writes, a
change in behavior may be indicative of a potential insider threat [30]. Freeman Den-
sity is a measure of the centrality of an actor based on the number of actors connected
to it. Bonacich Power is a metric taken to demonstrate the ability of social network
analysis to provide information about actor power and centrality. UCINet finds k-
cores, which are loose groups of actors in which more tightly-knit groups of actors
are found [11]. Changes to ego networks show that the actors that a certain actor
interacts with are changing.
4.1.7 Summary of Experiment Methodology.
The experiments outlined in this chapter determine whether or not a system that
automatically creates useful social network data out of SMTP data in a time-efficient
manner is possible.
4.2 Results and Findings
The first subsection shows the time taken for each component to complete its
task and provides commentary. In the next section, some social network metrics are
calculated with UCINET with the output of the system.
4.2.1 System Timing Test Results.
The average time required for the components to process three months of SMTP
data and generate social network data is about 80 minutes as shown in Table 5. On
average, it takes about half an hour to add a month to the database and generate a
set of social network data incorporating the new information as shown in Table 6.
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Component Runtime
ProxyListToUID < 1 min
SMTPLogSanitizer 54 min
SMTPLogParser 24 min
Database Import < 1 min
SQL Query < 1 min
Total (three months) ≈ 80 min
Table 5: Component Runtimes for Three Months
It is apparent that this process takes much less than a day and the system can
produce timely social network data. The majority of the time creating the social
network data is spent sanitizing and processing the SMTP logs. The SQL queries all
took seconds to run. The SQL queries used to import the parsed data took the most
time.
Component Runtime
ProxyListToUID < 1 min
SMTPLogSanitizer ≈20 min
SMTPLogParser ≈10 min
Database Import < 1 min
SQL Query < 1 min
Total (one month) ≈ 30 min
Table 6: Component Runtimes for One Month
4.2.1.1 ProxyListToUID.
The ProxyListToUID program was given the proxy list as input. From this
data, the program assigned 3454 email addresses to 1550 distinct users and wrote the
output to the UIDlist in under a second as shown in Table 7. This component had
little impact on the overall time to generate social network data.
4.2.1.2 SMTPLogSanitizer.
Over 170,000 total UIDs were assigned by SMTPLogSanitizer with an average
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Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Runtime 282 281 282
Table 7: ProxyListToUID Runtimes in Milliseconds
time of about 55 minutes as shown in Table 8. This was the most time consuming
of the components. The time spent sanitizing the SMTP logs from October was less
than the other months because a server crash in October caused fewer days to be
logged. There were 25 days logged in October, 30 in November, and 31 in December
as shown in Table 4.
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
October 15.4 14.5 17.7
November 21.3 20.1 20.1
December 20.6 19.7 18.7
Total 57.3 54.3 53.5
Table 8: SMTPLogSanitizer Runtimes in Minutes
The time required to sanitize a month’s logs appears independent. The time re-
quired to sanitize logs was expected to decrease as more email addresses were added to
the UID list, but this did not happen. Many new email addresses (always senders) are
created and added to the UID list every month as shown in Table 9. Many of the new
UIDs were assigned to addresses like BOUNCE-1234-1234124@fedweek.sparklist.com,
usually generated by mailing lists that users subscribe to.
UIDs Added
October 57,232
November 49,590
December 67,902
Total 174,724
Table 9: UIDs Added by the SMTPLogSanitizer
4.2.1.3 SMTPLogParser.
SMTPLogParser processed three months of data in the average time of about
54
24 minutes as shown in Table 10. As is expected, the time spent parsing a month is
independent. Each month, with about a million ties, took under 10 minutes to parse.
To clarify the difference between an email and a tie, when Alice sends an email
to Bob and Carol, one email was created by Alice and two ties, Alice → Bob and
Alice → Carol, are created. Ties are used to generate social network metrics.
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
October 6.9 6.9 6.2
November 9.1 8.7 8.3
December 9.3 8.0 7.9
Total 25.3 23.6 22.4
Table 10: SMTPLogParser Runtimes in Minutes
This component was given the output of the SMTPLogSanitizer as input as
specified in the Workload subsection. The SMTPLogParser mined the sanitized data
for over 1.8 million individual emails for a total of over 3 million connections between
users as shown in Figure 11. These numbers are consistent with the missing emails
from a week of server downtime in October.
Emails Ties
October 464,895 883,024
November 675,411 1,149,305
December 689,071 1,065,800
Total 1,829,377 3,098,129
Table 11: Number of Emails and Ties
4.2.1.4 Database Creation and Import.
Creating the database table required to hold the data took under a tenth of a sec-
ond. Importing one month of database-readable data generated by the SMTPLogParser
program took about 10 seconds as shown in Table 12. This component had little im-
pact on the overall time to generate social network data.
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Action Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Create Table 0.078 0.047 0.062
Import October 7.765 7.719 7.750
Import November 10.95 10.922 10.812
Import December 10.282 10.265 10.313
Table 12: Database Creation and Import Times in Seconds
4.2.1.5 Generate Social Network Data from Database Queries.
As specified in the workload subsection of the previous section, 12 different sets
of social network data were created. The query times required to generate all 12
different sets of social network data in the edgelist format took each less than six
seconds as shown in Table 13. This component had little impact on the overall time
to generate social network data.
Social Network Data Execution Time
All Months 5.2
All Months, Internal 1.9
All Months, Internal, # recipients < 20 1.4
October 2.1
October, Internal 1.4
October, Internal # recipients < 20 1.1
November 2.5
November, Internal 1.5
November, Internal, # recipients < 20 1.1
December 2.4
December, Internal 1.4
December, Internal, # recipients < 20 1.1
Table 13: Database Query Times in Seconds
4.2.2 Data Usefulness Test Results.
All 12 generated sociograms were imported by UCINet successfully and the
Freeman Degree, Bonacich Power, and k-core social network metrics were taken. The
entire network and certain ego networks were also visualized in NetDraw. Thus, the
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data created by the system is considered usable. Screenshots of UCINet outputs for
those metrics are shown in Figures 33-35.
The social network data can be visualized by NetDraw as shown in Figures
36-42. Figure 36 displays the sociogram corresponding to social network data in
December 2004. While complete, this visualization provides little information and
must be filtered. Figure 37 shows the egonet of Actor 59 in NetDraw and Figure 38
shows a more readable subset of the December 2004 network. Figures 39-42 showcase
different visualizations available in Netdraw for the egonet of Actor 1141.
4.3 Summary
The results show that useful social network data can be created by the system
developed in a timely manner. The total time to convert three months of SMTP
logs into social network data is about 80 minutes and is well within a day. The data
created by this system is readable by UCINet and can be visualized by NetDraw.
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Figure 33: Bonacich Power Metric Figure 34: UCINet Freeman Degree
Metric
Figure 35: UCINet Output for k-core Metric
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Figure 36: NetDraw Visualization of Social Network Data for December 2004
Figure 37: Egonet of Actor with UID 59
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Figure 38: Subset of the December 2004 Sociogram
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Figure 39: Spring-Embedding Visualiza-
tion
Figure 40: Gower Visualization
Figure 41: Circular Visualization Figure 42: Multi-Dimensional Scaling
Visualization
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations
This chapter reviews the research objectives, discusses the immediate and long-term
impact the proof of concept tool, and proposes goals and follow on work for this
research.
5.1 Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to efficiently generate social network data from
computer-mediated communication logs. The timeliness of execution and usability of
data created by the system were tested and as shown in the results of the experiment,
the developed system is able to generate social network data corresponding to three
months of SMTP logs in about 80 minutes. Additionally, the results showed that the
social network data created by the system is readable, analyzable, and visualizable
by standard social network analysis programs.
5.2 Impact
The findings of this research provide a great benefit to the field of social network
analysis and in turn impact the ability to monitor the behavior of employees and
mitigate the insider threat in the long run.
5.2.1 Immediate Impact.
The immediate impact of the software developed for this research is that social
network data of large groups is now available for social network analysis. This data
can hopefully provide some breakthroughs in the field of social network analysis in
terms of analyzing the short-term changes in social behavior and structure.
5.2.2 Long-Term Impact.
The long-term impact of this research is that longitudinal social network data
studies are now much easier to carry out as costly and time-consuming surveys are
no longer necessary. SMTP logs are available as long as there is a need for email, and
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Figure 43: Future Targets for Using SNA to Mitigate the Insider Threat
this research proved that social network data is extractable from a month of SMTP
data in under half an hour.
In terms of mitigating the insider threat, the long-term impact of this research
is dependent on the work of social network analysts. The future research of social
network analysts should focus on finding a way to characterize normal and abnormal
email behavior or deriving a behavior-based characterization for the insider threat.
These findings can be leveraged to generate an information providing tool for man-
agers.
5.3 Future Goals
Future goals that ultimately result in mitigating the insider threat through
social network analysis are shown in Figure 43. Creating timely social network data
is the necessary first step that makes the other steps possible. Some future research
necessary to reach this goal are outlined in this section.
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5.3.1 Characterizing Behavior.
The social network data generated by this research should be statistically an-
alyzed to determine if there are any trends or characterizations of user behavior. In
terms of mitigating the insider threat, social network analysis may focus on charac-
terizing the insider threat given representative sets of data. There are many different
methods and metrics of social network analysis and hopefully, some are able to pro-
vide useful information for characterization. As stated earlier, a characterization of
user behavior can be used to create a tool that will provide additional information to
managers about their subordinates.
5.3.2 Gathering More Live Data.
At the time that this research was conducted, there was no longitudinal data of
an insider developing or attacking. This made the research very difficult to validate
because there was nothing to attempt to detect. The insider threat is unique in this
aspect. Hopefully, organizations that have live data of an insider threat in action will
be willing to share it after sanitizing it, or be willing to share the social network data
generated. For example, the Enron email corpus could be used for this purpose [6].
5.3.3 Determining the Best Parameters.
Future research should try to determine the best parameters to use in the gener-
ation of social network data. These parameters should be chosen so that the resulting
data reflects actual social structure and behavior. These parameters include:
• Date range
• Date range selection
• Min/max thresholds for number of recipients
• Min/max thresholds for number of interactions
Knowing these parameters will help create more meaningful social network data
and in turn provide better results from analysis.
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5.3.4 Expansion to Other CMC Records.
As implemented, the system only works on records of email communication.
However, there are many different types of CMCs, with email being one of the most
well-known and accessible. Other sources of CMC records are phone logs, instant
messenging records, and web-access logs.
The more data available for research, the better. The data must be used cor-
rectly, but there is no harm in having more. More data interpreted correctly gives a
greater understanding of the users who create them.
5.3.5 Tool Improvements.
Possible improvements to the tool created in this research are listed in this
subsection.
5.3.5.1 UIDList Database.
Instead of using a user identification text file, use a database. A system with
512 MB of RAM ran out of memory while processing the tens of thousands of different
email addresses in the sanitization process.
5.3.5.2 Parallelization.
The ProxyListToUID program is parallelizable and distributed computing meth-
ods can be used to exploit this property. This would greatly speed up the process of
converting SMTP logs to social network data.
5.3.5.3 Data Sanitization.
The SMTPLogSanitizer in its current state only partially sanitizes the data, san-
itizing the username and leaving the domain name. For example jasonyee@af.mil
becomes <uniqueIDnumber>@af.mil. While this is essentially sufficient for the pri-
vacy of the users, for an even more anonymous solution, no evidence of domain name
should be present either. Doing so would require that there is a separate list of which
users are internal to the system.
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5.3.5.4 Unification, GUI.
As currently implemented, the system is a process consisting of independent
parts and no GUI. To enhance this system and increase the ease of use, the components
can be combined together in one program with a GUI.
5.4 Summary
This research provided a means of efficiently generating social network data from
records of computer mediated communications. This tool has an immediate impact
upon the field of social network analysis and lays the foundation for a tool that can
potentially mitigate the insider threat.
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